Reviewed by Ralph B. Levering, Davidson College
The year 2007 was a memorable one for Cold War scholarship. Among the outstanding books on the Cold War published that year were Wilson D. Miscamble's From Roosevelt to Truman, which at long last has replaced John Lewis Gaddis's classic The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941 War, -1947 War, (1972 as the most important book on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1940s; Vladimir M. Zubok's A Failed Empire, the most valuable study yet to appear of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War; and Jeremi Suri's Henry Kissinger and the American Century, an unusually balanced and insightful work on Kissinger's contributions to international relations in the 1960s and 1970s. These three books belong on any list of the most illuminating studies of the Cold War.
Despite signiªcant shortcomings, Melvyn D. Lefºer's For the Soul of Mankind belongs in this distinguished company. Like Lefºer's two other major books, The Elusive Quest (1979) and A Predominance of Power (1992) , his new study is ambitiously conceptualized, prodigiously researched, and vigorously argued. Perhaps more to his credit because of how hard it is for scholars to change, the new book is much more clearly and engagingly written than his previous books. Indeed, the writing is often eloquent and pithy, two adjectives seldom used when describing scholarly discourse these days. The book also presents policymakers as full human beings, deserving praise as well as criticism, much more effectively than Lefºer has ever done before.
An example of Lefºer's extraordinary writing is his summary of the "remarkable relationship" between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan: "They had shared a sense of optimism, an appreciation of human agency, and a sense of destiny. They had brought warmth, humor, and candor to their interactions. They could listen to one another and learn from one another. They understood the principles that separated them and appreciated the values that united them, most particularly their aversion to nuclear weapons and their yearning for peace" (p. 422).
The book's scope is well described in the titles of its ªve long chapters. These are "The Origins of the Cold War, 1945-48: Stalin and Truman"; "The Chance for Peace, 1953-54: Malenkov and Eisenhower"; "Retreat from Armageddon, 1962-65: Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Johnson"; "The Erosion of Detente, 1975-80: Brezhnev and Carter"; and " The End of the Cold War, 1985-90: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush." The basic argument is that U.S. and Soviet leaders, beginning with Joseph Stalin and Harry Truman and extending through Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter, were unable to bridge the ideological and other chasms that separated their two countries. In contrast, Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush were able to do so, spurred by Gorbachev's leadership, thus ending the Cold War.
This summary does not begin to do justice to the subtlety and complexity of Lefºer's argument. Every chapter-especially the last four-deserves a careful reading both for the development of Lefºer's generally persuasive argument and for the numerous quotations from U.S. and Soviet-bloc ofªcials. Many of these quotations, derived from extensive research in Western sources and in recently published Easternbloc materials, will be new even to specialists in Cold War history. Only the ªrst chapter compares poorly with other outstanding works on the subject-notably Miscamble's From Roosevelt to Truman.
Lefºer is especially to be praised for giving weight to ideology as a cause of the Cold War in the mid-1940s and as a major reason for its continuation until the late 1980s. The book begins with an apt quotation from former president George H. W. Bush in 2004: "The Cold War was a struggle for the very soul of mankind. It was a struggle for a way of life" (p. 3). This view is similar to my favorite one-sentence deªnition of the Cold War, put forth by Frank Ninkovich in The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 150: "The cold war was a historical struggle over which ideology or way of life would be able to form the basis of a global civilization." Lefºer acknowledges that "[a] decade ago, when I began work on this book, I would not have thought that I would come to view the Cold War in this manner" (p. 3). For many reasons, including Lefºer's altered perspective on ideology and the greatly improved writing, this book is superior to A Preponderance of Power. Unlike that work, this one could be seriously considered as a textbook on the Cold War for advanced undergraduates.
Four weaknesses stand out. First, Lefºer argues that there were "lost opportunities" (p. 8) to end the Cold War well before the 1980s. Yet the careful analysis in the body of the book makes clear that the Cold War could not have ended until Soviet leaders abandoned their belief in Communism as the inevitable wave of the future or until U.S. leaders stopped resisting Communist advances. The ªrst possibility occurred under Gorbachev and basically ended the Cold War.
Second, Lefºer is too quick to play down the expansionist tendencies of Third World Communist movements and the validity, at least in anti-Communist leaders' perceptions, of the domino theory. Lefºer and other scholars of the Cold War need to give as much credence to the fervent desire of many Communist leaders (e.g., Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro) to hasten the "inevitable" triumph of Communism as they do to the determination of anti-Communist U.S. leaders (e.g., John Foster Dulles and William Casey) to stop its further spread. In Triumph Forsaken (2006), Mark Moyar shows that belief in the domino theory was widespread among Southeast Asian leaders in the early 1960s. Lefºer in several quotations, but not in his analysis, also shows that the domino theory was important in U.S. ofªcials' thinking on Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s.
Third, the book needed careful editing to trim the length (467 pages of text) by 10 or 15 percent. It includes too much detail on the lives and careers of top leaders before they gained power, and many of the quotations are too long.
Fourth, the conclusion is the weakest part of the book. Lefºer implicitly denies the challenge to Western interests of Soviet-backed insurgencies in the Third World in the 1970s (pp. 455-456) and gives Reagan too much credit for ending the Cold War. Although Lefºer rightly sees Gorbachev as "the indispensable agent of change," he insists that Reagan was "critically important" (p. 466). But one could argue that any of the presidents Lefºer discusses, joined by Congress and the American people, would also have gladly accepted the ending of the Cold War "on American terms" (p. 464), which, as Lefºer notes, is precisely what Gorbachev offered Reagan.
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Reviewed by Rolf Steininger, University of Innsbruck
On 12 March 1951 the Israeli government sent a letter to the four occupying powers in Germany demanding restitution from Germany: $1 billion from West Germany, $500 million from Communist East Germany.
The Western powers immediately responded by recommending direct talks between Israel and the West German government. The Soviet answer did not come until a year later: On 24 March 1952, two weeks after Iosif Stalin had put forward in his famous note a proposal for a peace treaty of a united Germany, he made clear that no talks about restitution could occur before a peace treaty with Germany was signed. Because no peace treaty came about, no restitution was forthcoming from East Germany.
First contacts between Israel and West Germany were made in Paris on 19 April 1951. A year later, talks ofªcially started in the Dutch town of Wassenaar because the Israelis refused to tread on German soil. Despite massive right-wing protests in Israel against the talks, a historic agreement was signed in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952 by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett: West Germany agreed to pay $3.45 billion.
At that time Israel had been on the brink of starvation and desperately needed
